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Harless et al.: Recent Cases

RECENT CASES
cRIMINAL LAW-Degree of Negligence Necessary to Sustain
a Conviction of Involuntary Manslaughter. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the indictment alleging that the
homicide resulted from the negligent operation of an automobile
in violation of certain statutes of this State. Therd being no statutory
definition of the offense in South Carolina, the trial court necessarily charged the Common Law definition that "involuntary manslaughter may consist in the killing of another without malice and unintentionally but while one is fiegligently engaged in doing a lawful act".
The usual definition of negligence was stated but the jury was not
instructed as to gross negligence, recklessness, or wantonness. Defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in not
charging that the State must show gross negligence or recklessness
and that ordinary negligence would not suffice. On appeal, HELD,
affirmed. An automobile is a. dangerous instrumentality and the
want of ordinary care in the handling of such is the equivalent of culpable or gross negligence. State v. Barnett, 218 S. C. 415, 63 S. E. 2d
57.
The negligence required for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is generally greater than that called for in civil issues and
must be of a gross or flagiant character. State v. Davis, 128 S. C. 265,
122 S. E. 770 (1924) ; State v. Satterfield, 198 N. C. 682, 153 S. E.
155 (1930). It must be of such a nature as to display an indifference
to consequences which will be a substitute for actual criminal intent.
State v. Clardy, 73 §. C. 340, 53 S. E. 493 (1905). Some jurisdictions have interpreted# the terms "culpable negligence" or "criminal
negligence", in their statutes defining involuntary manslaughter, to
mean a giossly careless disregard for the public safety and welfare.
Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926); Cain v. State,
55 Ga. App. 376, 190 S. E. 371 (1937). Wisconsin courts define
gross negligence as a willingness to inflict injury which the law deems
equivalent to an intent to injure. State v. Whatley, 210 Wis. 15,
245 N. W. 93 (1932). And in the common law jurisdictions there
must be more than simple negligence on the defendant's part in order to sustain a conviction. State v. Davis, supra. As a general
rule, there need be shown only simple negligence in the handling of a
highly dangerous instrumentality in order to sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter; whereas a greater degree of negligence must
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be evidenced in the case of one handling a harmless instrument. State
v. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 S. E. 6 (1903); Pamplin v. State, 21
Okla. Cr. 136, 205 P. 521 (1922). Decisions are almost unanimous
in holding that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality.
Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509, 77 S. E. 618 (1913) ; Maloney v.
Kaplan, 233 N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922). However, a vehicle
in a bad state of repair is inherently dangerous. Texas Co. v. Veloz,
.... Tex ..... , 162 S. W. 377 (1913). In spite of majority opinion to
the contrary, a few jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have
held an automobile a dangerous instrumentality, and consider one
causing death through its negligent use as guilty of manslaughter as
had the death resulted from the use of fire arms. State v. Hanahan,
111 S. C. 58, 96 S. E. 667 (1918); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). In South Carolina the statutory offense of reckless homicide provides a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both, when the death of any person results from injuries received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the
safety of others. Sec. 56 S. C. Acts and Joint Resolutions 1949,
p. 482. It is sometimes argued that statutes such as these are designed as substitutes for the common law manslaughter offense,
which provides a maximum penalty of three years when death results from the use of motor vehicles. Phillipsv. State, 204 Ark. 205,
161 S. W. 2d 747 (1942); People v. Crow, 48 Cal. App. Rep. 666,
120 P. 2d 686 (1941). But in South Carolina, the statute discloses a
contrary intention; it provides that the offense of reckless homicide
"shall not affect, impair, or repeal" the statute fixing the punishment
for involuntary manslaughter. Sec. 56 S. C. Acts and Joint Resolutions 1949, p. 482.
The decision supports the rule that an automobile is an inherently
dangerous instrument, but it must be conceded that only scant support can be found for it in other jurisdictions. A motor vehicle has
many inherent, dangerous propensities. In the hands of an inexperienced, incapable or physically handicapped driver, it becomes
dangerous, but certainly it is not per se a dangerous instrumentality.
It seems South Carolina is confronted with a rather peculiar situation in automobile-homicide cases not involving the elements of murder. The solicitor may prosecute the accused for reckless homicide
in which event the State must show recklessness, or he may seek a
conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which requires only simple
negligence. Therefore, a person guilty of only simple negligence in
the handling of an automobile must be given a mandatory jail sen-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/8

2

HarlessCASES
et al.: Recent Cases
RncMNT

tence, while
alternative.
the basis of
the decision

one guilty of recklessness may be subject to a fine as an
In the present case two Justices concurred solely on
the doctrine of stare decisis, illustrating a weakness in
and a possible turn toward the contrary.
H. V. HAiu.ss.

PUBLIC OFFICERS - Effect of Resignation Prior to Election
or Appointment., A county sheriff died in office after serving approximately one year of a four year term. Respondent, deceased
sheriff's wife, was promised the recommendation of the county delegation for appointment to the unexpired term, provided she execute
and deliver to the delegation an undated resignation of the office.
Respondent complied with the condition, was duly recommended by
the delegation, and was appointed by the Governor to the sheriff's
office, which she held at the time of this action. Some fourteen
months after respondent was appointed, a member of the county
delegation submitted the resignation to the Governor and the Governor accepted. Respondent repudiated the resignation immediately.
Subsequently, the Governor, on recommendation of the delegation,
appointed the petitioner to fill the alleged vacancy created by the
resignation. This action was a proceeding of original jurisdiction

in the Supreme Court in the nature of mandamus to determine which
party had the right to exercise the office of sheriff. HELD, for respondent. The undated resignation executed by respondent before
her appointment and qualification was void; and no vacancy existed

to which petitioner could be appointed. Jackson v. White, 218 S. C.
311, 62 S. E. 2d 776 (1950).
There has never been any question in this country but that an incumbent of a civil office has a right to resign his office. State ex rel
Young v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 N. W. 486 (1908). Incumbent refers to him alone who has possession of the office. Miller 7.
Board of Supervisors, 25 Cal. 94 (1864). To constitute a complete
and operative resignation of office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
State ex rel Young v. Ladeen, supra; Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62
(1857). However, a resignation implies that the person resigning
has been elected or appointed into the office which he resigns. A man
cannot resign that to which he is not entitled and which he has no
right to occupy. T]ze Queen v. Blivard, L. R. 2 Q. B. 55 (Eng.
1866) ; In re Corliss, 11 R. I. 638, 23 Am. Rep. 538 (1876). There-
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fore, one cannot resign an office to which he has bten elected oi appointed until the time has arrived whbn he is entitled by law to jossess the office, and has taken the oath, given the required bond, and
entered upon the discharge of its duties.
1ller v. Board of Supervisors, supra. An attempt by one to resign an office before he has
qualified and entered upon the discharge of its duties is abortive and
ineffectual. Miller v. Board of Supervisors, supra. The obtaining
of a resignation from a person before his appointment to a public
office is obviously detrimental to the public interest. Dolphin v.
Mayor and Ccnicil of Town of Kearny, 116 N. J. L. 58, 181 Ati.
644 (1935). It has never been contemplated that when the law conferred the power to appoint, but not to remove, the power to remove
might be conferred by requiring a person, as a condition precedent
to appointment, to place his resignation in the hands of the appointing power. Such a resignation is held to be void from its inception,
neclssarily; to prevent designing persons, from defeating the public
will. People ex rel Dibelka v. Reinberg, 263 Ill. 536, 105 N. E. 715
(1914). Furtheri a public officer's resignation) procured by duress, is
voidable and may be repudiated, especially where the duress is imposed by authorities having the duty of accepting or rejecting the
resignation. Board of Education v. Rose, 285 Ky. 217, 147 S. w.
2d 83 (1940). However, in Pollock v. City of Philadelphia,42 D. &
C. 17 (1941), the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas held; that
While courts do not in general look with favor upon undated resignations from public employees, an undated resignation will be held
effective when freely given, prior to employment, without duress or
coercion, for a proper purpose, and where accepted by a lawful authority for a proper purpose, under proper circumstances, before repudiation.
The result reached by the court in the principal case is not only
the correct result, but the only possible result if the public is to receive the benefit of independent office holders. The slightest relaxation of the rule on which the principal case was based, such as was
done in Pollock v. City of Philadelphia, supra, would be disasterous.
While there was apparently no evidence of improper purposes by
the county delegation in the principal case, such conduct, if allowed
to be effective by the courts, would be inductive of unethical practices by designing persons to the great detriment of society.
J. F. BuzHAmW.
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Attorney's Liens. Complainant represented defendant in divorce proceedings and secured an agreement whereby defendant's former husband conveyed to her his interest in their home for a reasonable sum of money. Title to the
house was conveyed to the complainant, as defendant's attorney, and
to the former husband's attorney as a temporary measure to assure
compliance with the agreement. It was understood that complainant would not join in reconveying the pr6perty to the defendant until his fees were fully paid. Because of threatened suit by defendant
to compel the complainant to join in reconveying the property, the
complainant entered this suit claiming a lien on the real property.
The lower court entered a decree for the defendant and complainant
appealed. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. Where property was conveyed to complainant-attorney and opposing counsel, not for benefit of counsel but in trust for respective clients, with understanding
that the two attorneys would reconvey to complainant's client as soon
as agreement could be carried out, complainant attorney had no lien
on real property for services rendered. Ashman v. Shecter,.
Md.
76 A. 2d 139 (1950).
Attorney's liens are of two kinds; one is called the general, retaining, or possessory lien, and the other the special, particular, or charging lien. Northrup v. Haywood, 102 Minn. 307, 113 N. W. 701
(1907) ; Hale v. Tyson, 202 Ala. 107,79 So. 499 (1918). The general or retaining lien of an attorney is the lien which attaches to the
client's papers, money, or documents connected with the litigation
and coming into the attorney's hands in the course of his employment, and gives the attorney the right to retain such "papers, property, or money until all his cost and charges against his client are paid.
In re Heinsheimer, 214 N. Y. 361, 108 N. E. 636 (1915). It is a
common law lien founded and depending upon possession. Reynolds
v. Warner, 128 Neb. 304, 258 N. W. 462, 97 A. L. R. 1128 (1935).
As distinguished from the retaining lien, the charging lien of an attorney is an equitable Tight to have the fees and cost due to him for
services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment in that particular suit. Weed v. Bontelle, 56 Vt. 570, 48 Am. Rep. 821 (1884);
Robertson v. Pettery, 114 W. Va. 78, 170 S. E. 901 (1933). This
lien is not dependent on, nor does it rest upon possession, but is
based upon the broad principle of justice that an attorney, as a recognized officer of the court, should be paid his fees and expenses out
of an r judgment obtained as a result of his labor and skill. Collins
v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21 P. 2d 709 (1933). The minority of
courts in the United States follow the English and Canadian view
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that the charging lien of an attorney is confined to his taxable cost
and disbursements in the suit. Skinner v. Sweet, 3 Madd. 244, 56
Eng. Rep. 499 (1818); Scharlock v. Oland, 1 Rich. L. 209 (S. C.
1845); however, courts in the majority have extended this lien to
include compensation for the service of the attorney. Coughlin v.
New York C. & H. R. R., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75 (1877).
In absence of statutory provision an attorney has no lien upon the
naked cause of action of his client, but such lien attaches only after
judgment is rendered. Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Ore. 88, 92 P.
1079 (1907). By statute a number of states allow a charging lien to
attach to the judgment rendered upon real estate, moneys, or other
property recovered by means of his exertions and labors; Stenart v.
D'Esterre,187 App. Div. 935, 174 N. Y. S. 922 (1919), affirming 170
N. Y. S. 936 (1918); however, in absence of statute or agreement
providing therefor, many jurisdictions refuse to allow such attachment. Hull v. Culver, 143 Ill. 506, 32 N. E. 265 (1892). At common law it is held, by weight of authority that an attorney has no
charging lien against land involved in litigation, which he fias recovered for his client, or the title to which he has successfully defended against attack. W. Tt Rawleigh Co. v. Timmerman, 205 Ala.
233, 87 So. 372 (1920); Humphrey v. Browning, 46 Ill. 476, 95 Am.
Dec. 446 (1868); Smalley v. Clark, 22 Vt. 598 (1850); McCoy v.
McCoy, 36 W. Va. 772, 15 S. R. 973 (1892). Thus, in McCoy v.
McCoy, supra, it was held that an attorney had no lien on land for
his services in obtaining a decree directing a sale thereof for the payment of debts; and it was further held in Smalley v. Clark, supra,
that a solicitor in chancery who successfully prosecuted to final decree
a suit to quiet title to his client's land had no specific lien on the lands
for his fee. Courts in the minority have held that even in the absence
of statute or contract providing therefor, an attorney has a lien for
his services on realty recovered for his client. Scott v. Kirtley, 113
Fla. 637, 152 So. 721, 93 A. L. R. 661 (1933).
The result reached in the instant case is in accord with the greater
weight of the decided cases in the United States. This case is even
clearer than those above setting forth the majority rule because
here the complainant did not even acquire the property as a result of
the suit to acquire title. The property was conveyed to complainant
and opposing counsel, not for the benefit of the counsel but in trust
for their respective clients, with the understanding that the two attorneys would reconvey the property to the defendant as soon as the
agreement could be carried out. As has been stated attorney's fees are
not taxable as cost, and so if an attorney's lien were allowed on real
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property, a bona fide purchaser of the property or judgment creditors
might suffer grievous loss. The law does not encourage secret liens
and if liens were allowed for the professional services of lawyers, no
one could foresee the difficulties and confusion that would result, as
every tract of land which had been the subject of litigation would lose
most of its exchangeable value from an apprehension of some latent
lien in favor of some attorney.
B. B. BOZtMAN.
CONFLICT OF LAWS - Extrastate Enforcement of State Tax
Laws. Plaintiff, a municipal corporation, levied a tax on personal
property of defendant which was situated in plaintiff's jurisdiction
in 1943. To collect this claim, which became a debt according to
the laws of Michigan, the plaintiff brought suit in the Municipal Court
of the City of New York. The defendant prevailed on a motion for
dismissal of the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that the court
lacked jurisdiction of the subject of the action. The Appellate
Term reversed this determination. On appeal, HELD, reversed.
New York courts do not lend themselves to the enforcement of
revenue laws of another state. Wayne County v. Amzerican Steel
Export Co., 101 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (1950).
In England, the previously oft-asserted dictum that the courts of
one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another was asserted
as ratio decidendi in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull, 1 K. B.
7 (1908). Thereafter in England a strict application of the rule appears to have been established, e. g., The Queen of Holland v. Drukker, 1 Ch. D. 877 (1928). In the United States, revenue laws have
generally been classed with penal laws as being extraterritorially unenforceable. The leading case, Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71,
133 N. E. 357 (1921), in disallowing a Colorado suit against the
estate of a former resident, uttered the now famous dictum that one
state will not enforce the revenue laws of another. In New York
the doctrine as so stated has now become the established law. In re
Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. Rep. 773, 202 N. Y. S. 185 (1923);
Matter of Martin, 255 N. Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753 (1931) ; In re Daltroff's Estate, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (1943). A federal court first considered the issue in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929),
aff'd on other grounds, 281 U. S. 18 (1930), where the United
States Supreme Court expressly refused to decide the question of
extrastate enforcement of tax laws. Dicta in several subsequefit opinions of the Court are favorable to the enforcement of tax claims
arising in sister states. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,
296 U. S. 268, 275 (1935) ; Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1,
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20 (1939). In perhaps the earliest contra holding, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina allowed a recovery of taxes due under the
statutes of another state in Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co.,
138 N. C. 248, 50 S.E. 650, 70 L. R. A. 183 (1905), although in so
doing it did not expressly consider the doctrine here reviewed. More
significantly, the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Oklahomna Tax Commission v. Rodgers,1 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W. 2d
919, 165 A. L. R. 785 (1946), squarely challenged, seriatim, the arguments in support of the established rule and in a persuasive opinion
upheld the propriety of entertaining a suit to collect a tax levied in
another state. In a recent Ohio case, the views expressed in the
Rodgers case were given weight in overruling a demurrer to a suit
for extra-territorial collection of taxes, although the petition was
found defective on other grounds. Minnesota v. Karp, 84 Ohio App.
51, 84 N. E. 2d 76 (1948). A February, 1951, Kentucky decision
was to the effect that its courts were not precluded from furnishing
extra-territorial enforcement of Ohio tax laws. State of Ohio ex rel.
Duffy v. Arnett, 234 S.W. 2d 722 (Ky. 1950). Contra: Detroit v.
Proctor,61 A. 2d 412 (Del. 1948).
In South Carolina it appears that the issue of the extraterritorial
enforcement of the revenue laws of sister states is a matter res integra.
It cannot be questioned that the principal case was decided in accordance with the weight of authority both in Great Britain and the
United States. However, there are indications of a trend to the contrary, based on the compelling considerations which provided the
rationale of the Rodgers case. The possibility of evasion of taxes
by the simple expedient of crossing a state line presents a serious
loophole in existing machinery for the collection of revenue. There
is no extradition to reach tax evaders, except as to criminal tax violators. There appears to be an increasing public morality concerning
the payment of taxes which might well be the forerunner of a change
in the current of judicial authority. Some states are meeting this
challenge with legislation providing that the revenue laws of other
states will be enforced on a reciprocal basis. A decision by the Supreme Court expressly broadening application of the full faith and
credit clause to include enforcement of sister states' tax claims appears to be required.
T. C. FirzGoiALD, JR.
1. The Rodgers case has been met with striking approbation in the law reviews,

34 CALn . L. Riv. 754 (1946); 46 CoL. L. RFy. 1013 (1946); 41 ILL. L. Rav.
439 (1946); 15 KAN. CiTY L. REv. 52 (1946); 31 MINN. L. Rav. 93 (1946);
24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. (1949); 25 Tax. L. Ray. 88 (1946); 33 VA. L.
Rxv. 179 (1947).

Its views had been presaged in Leflar, "ExtrastateEnforce-

inent of Penal and Governmental Claims," 46 H. v.L. REv. 193 (1932).
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